1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 2021 Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
3  *
4  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
5  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
6  * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
7  *
8  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
9  * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
10  * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
11  * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
12  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
13  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
14  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
15  */
16 
17 #include "gmid.h"
18 
19 #if DISABLE_SANDBOX
20 
21 #warning "Sandbox disabled! Please report issues upstream instead of disabling the sandbox."
22 
23 void
24 sandbox_server_process(void)
25 {
26 	return;
27 }
28 
29 void
30 sandbox_executor_process(void)
31 {
32         log_notice(NULL, "Sandbox disabled!  "
33 	    "Please report issues upstream instead of disabling the sandbox.");
34 }
35 
36 void
37 sandbox_logger_process(void)
38 {
39 	return;
40 }
41 
42 #elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
43 
44 #include <sys/capsicum.h>
45 
46 void
47 sandbox_server_process(void)
48 {
49 	if (cap_enter() == -1)
50 		fatal("cap_enter");
51 }
52 
53 void
54 sandbox_executor_process(void)
55 {
56 	/*
57 	 * We cannot capsicum the executor process because it needs to
58 	 * fork(2)+execve(2) cgi scripts
59 	 */
60 	return;
61 }
62 
63 void
64 sandbox_logger_process(void)
65 {
66 	if (cap_enter() == -1)
67 		fatal("cap_enter");
68 }
69 
70 #elif defined(__linux__)
71 
72 #include <sys/prctl.h>
73 #include <sys/syscall.h>
74 #include <sys/syscall.h>
75 #include <sys/types.h>
76 
77 #include <linux/audit.h>
78 #include <linux/filter.h>
79 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
80 
81 #include <errno.h>
82 #include <fcntl.h>
83 #include <stddef.h>
84 #include <stdio.h>
85 #include <string.h>
86 
87 #if HAVE_LANDLOCK
88 # include "landlock_shim.h"
89 #endif
90 
91 /* uncomment to enable debugging.  ONLY FOR DEVELOPMENT */
92 /* #define SC_DEBUG */
93 
94 #ifdef SC_DEBUG
95 # define SC_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
96 #else
97 # define SC_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
98 #endif
99 
100 #if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
101 # define SC_ARG_LO	0
102 # define SC_ARG_HI	sizeof(uint32_t)
103 #elif (BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN)
104 # define SC_ARG_LO	sizeof(uint32_t)
105 # define SC_ARG_HI	0
106 #else
107 # error "Uknown endian"
108 #endif
109 
110 /* make the filter more readable */
111 #define SC_ALLOW(nr)						\
112 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_##nr, 0, 1),	\
113 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
114 
115 /*
116  * SC_ALLOW_ARG and the SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH below are courtesy of
117  * https://roy.marples.name/git/dhcpcd/blob/HEAD:/src/privsep-linux.c
118  */
119 #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg, _val)						\
120 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6),			\
121 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS,					\
122 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg)]) + SC_ARG_LO),		\
123 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K,					\
124 	    ((_val) & 0xffffffff), 0, 3),					\
125 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS,					\
126 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg)]) + SC_ARG_HI),		\
127 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K,					\
128 	    (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_val) >> 32)) & 0xffffffff), 0, 1),		\
129 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),				\
130 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS,					\
131 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
132 
133 /*
134  * I personally find this quite nutty.  Why can a system header not
135  * define a default for this?
136  */
137 #if defined(__i386__)
138 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_I386
139 #elif defined(__x86_64__)
140 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
141 #elif defined(__arc__)
142 #  if defined(__A7__)
143 #    if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
144 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCOMPACT
145 #    else
146 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCOMPACTBE
147 #    endif
148 #  elif defined(__HS__)
149 #    if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
150 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCV2
151 #    else
152 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARCV2BE
153 #    endif
154 #  else
155 #    error "Platform does not support seccomp filter yet"
156 #  endif
157 #elif defined(__arm__)
158 #  ifndef EM_ARM
159 #    define EM_ARM 40
160 #  endif
161 #  if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
162 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
163 #  else
164 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARMEB
165 #  endif
166 #elif defined(__aarch64__)
167 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
168 #elif defined(__alpha__)
169 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ALPHA
170 #elif defined(__hppa__)
171 #  if defined(__LP64__)
172 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC64
173 #  else
174 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC
175 #  endif
176 #elif defined(__ia64__)
177 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_IA64
178 #elif defined(__microblaze__)
179 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MICROBLAZE
180 #elif defined(__m68k__)
181 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_M68K
182 #elif defined(__mips__)
183 #  if defined(__MIPSEL__)
184 #    if defined(__LP64__)
185 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
186 #    else
187 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
188 #    endif
189 #  elif defined(__LP64__)
190 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
191 #  else
192 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
193 #  endif
194 #elif defined(__nds32__)
195 #  if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
196 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_NDS32
197 #else
198 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_NDS32BE
199 #endif
200 #elif defined(__nios2__)
201 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_NIOS2
202 #elif defined(__or1k__)
203 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_OPENRISC
204 #elif defined(__powerpc64__)
205 #  if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
206 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
207 #  else
208 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
209 #  endif
210 #elif defined(__powerpc__)
211 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_PPC
212 #elif defined(__riscv)
213 #  if defined(__LP64__)
214 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
215 #  else
216 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV32
217 #  endif
218 #elif defined(__s390x__)
219 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
220 #elif defined(__s390__)
221 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_S390
222 #elif defined(__sh__)
223 #  if defined(__LP64__)
224 #    if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
225 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL64
226 #    else
227 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SH64
228 #    endif
229 #  else
230 #    if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
231 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL
232 #    else
233 #      define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SH
234 #    endif
235 #  endif
236 #elif defined(__sparc__)
237 #  if defined(__arch64__)
238 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC64
239 #  else
240 #    define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC
241 #  endif
242 #elif defined(__xtensa__)
243 #  define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_XTENSA
244 #else
245 #  error "Platform does not support seccomp filter yet"
246 #endif
247 
248 static struct sock_filter filter[] = {
249 	/* load the *current* architecture */
250 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
251 	    (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
252 	/* ensure it's the same that we've been compiled on */
253 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,
254 	    SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
255 	/* if not, kill the program */
256 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SC_FAIL),
257 
258 	/* load the syscall number */
259 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
260 	    (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),
261 
262 #ifdef __NR_accept
263 	SC_ALLOW(accept),
264 #endif
265 #ifdef __NR_accept4
266 	SC_ALLOW(accept4),
267 #endif
268 #ifdef __NR_brk
269 	SC_ALLOW(brk),
270 #endif
271 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
272 	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
273 #endif
274 #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
275 	SECCOMP_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
276 #endif
277 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
278 	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime64),
279 #endif
280 #ifdef __NR_close
281 	SC_ALLOW(close),
282 #endif
283 #ifdef __NR_epoll_ctl
284 	SC_ALLOW(epoll_ctl),
285 #endif
286 #ifdef __NR_epoll_pwait
287 	SC_ALLOW(epoll_pwait),
288 #endif
289 #ifdef __NR_epoll_wait
290 	SC_ALLOW(epoll_wait),
291 #endif
292 #ifdef __NR_exit
293 	SC_ALLOW(exit),
294 #endif
295 #ifdef __NR_exit_group
296 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
297 #endif
298 #ifdef __NR_fcntl
299 	SC_ALLOW(fcntl),
300 #endif
301 #ifdef __NR_fcntl64
302 	SC_ALLOW(fcntl64),
303 #endif
304 #ifdef __NR_fstat
305 	SC_ALLOW(fstat),
306 #endif
307 #ifdef __NR_fstat64
308 	SC_ALLOW(fstat64),
309 #endif
310 #ifdef __NR_getdents64
311 	SC_ALLOW(getdents64),
312 #endif
313 #ifdef __NR_getpid
314 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
315 #endif
316 #ifdef __NR_getrandom
317 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
318 #endif
319 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
320 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
321 #endif
322 #ifdef __NR_ioctl
323 	/* allow ioctl only on fd 1, glibc doing stuff? */
324         SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 0, 1),
325 #endif
326 #ifdef __NR_lseek
327 	SC_ALLOW(lseek),
328 #endif
329 #ifdef __NR_madvise
330 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
331 #endif
332 #ifdef __NR_mmap
333 	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
334 #endif
335 #ifdef __NR_mmap2
336 	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
337 #endif
338 #ifdef __NR_munmap
339 	SC_ALLOW(munmap),
340 #endif
341 #ifdef __NR_newfstatat
342 	SC_ALLOW(newfstatat),
343 #endif
344 #ifdef __NR_oldfstat
345 	SC_ALLOW(oldfstat),
346 #endif
347 #ifdef __NR_openat
348 	SC_ALLOW(openat),
349 #endif
350 #ifdef __NR_prlimit64
351 	SC_ALLOW(prlimit64),
352 #endif
353 #ifdef __NR_read
354 	SC_ALLOW(read),
355 #endif
356 #ifdef __NR_recvmsg
357 	SC_ALLOW(recvmsg),
358 #endif
359 #ifdef __NR_readv
360 	SC_ALLOW(readv),
361 #endif
362 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigaction
363 	SC_ALLOW(rt_sigaction),
364 #endif
365 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigreturn
366 	SC_ALLOW(rt_sigreturn),
367 #endif
368 #ifdef __NR_sendmsg
369 	SC_ALLOW(sendmsg),
370 #endif
371 #ifdef __NR_statx
372 	SC_ALLOW(statx),
373 #endif
374 #ifdef __NR_write
375 	SC_ALLOW(write),
376 #endif
377 #ifdef __NR_writev
378 	SC_ALLOW(writev),
379 #endif
380 
381 	/* disallow everything else */
382 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SC_FAIL),
383 };
384 
385 #ifdef SC_DEBUG
386 
387 #include <signal.h>
388 #include <unistd.h>
389 
390 static void
391 sandbox_seccomp_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx)
392 {
393 	(void)signum;
394 	(void)ctx;
395 
396 	fprintf(stderr, "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)\n",
397 	    __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
398 	_exit(1);
399 }
400 
401 static void
402 sandbox_seccomp_catch_sigsys(void)
403 {
404 	struct sigaction act;
405 	sigset_t mask;
406 
407 	memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
408 	sigemptyset(&mask);
409 	sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
410 
411 	act.sa_sigaction = &sandbox_seccomp_violation;
412 	act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
413 	if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
414 		fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s",
415 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
416 
417 	if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
418 		fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s\n",
419 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
420 }
421 #endif	/* SC_DEBUG */
422 
423 #if HAVE_LANDLOCK
424 static inline int
425 gmid_create_landlock_rs(struct landlock_ruleset_attr *attr, size_t len,
426     __u32 flags)
427 {
428 	int fd;
429 
430 	fd = landlock_create_ruleset(attr, len, 0);
431 	if (fd == -1) {
432 		switch (errno) {
433 		case ENOSYS:
434 			fatal("%s: failed to create ruleset.  "
435 			    "Landlock doesn't seem to be supported by the "
436 			    "current kernel.", __func__);
437 		case EOPNOTSUPP:
438 			log_warn(NULL, "%s: failed to create ruleset.  "
439 			    "Landlock seems to be currently disabled; "
440 			    "continuing without it.", __func__);
441 			break;
442 		default:
443 			fatal("%s: failed to create ruleset: %s",
444 			    __func__, strerror(errno));
445 		}
446 	}
447 
448 	return fd;
449 }
450 
451 static int
452 server_landlock(void)
453 {
454 	int		 fd, err;
455 	struct vhost	*h;
456 	struct location	*l;
457 
458 	/*
459 	 * These are all the actions that we want to either allow or
460 	 * disallow.  Things like LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE are
461 	 * omitted because are already handled by seccomp.
462 	 */
463 	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
464 		.handled_access_fs =	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE	|
465 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE	|
466 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR	|
467 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR	|
468 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR	|
469 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG	|
470 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK	|
471 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO	|
472 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK	|
473 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM,
474 	};
475 
476 	/*
477 	 * These are all the actions allowed for the root directories
478 	 * of the vhosts.  All the other rules mentioned in
479 	 * ruleset_attr and omitted here are implicitly disallowed.
480 	 */
481 	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = {
482 		.allowed_access =	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
483 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
484 	};
485 
486 	fd = gmid_create_landlock_rs(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
487 	if (fd == -1)
488 		return -1;
489 
490 	TAILQ_FOREACH(h, &hosts, vhosts) {
491 		TAILQ_FOREACH(l, &h->locations, locations) {
492 			if (l->dir == NULL)
493 				continue;
494 
495 			path_beneath.parent_fd = open(l->dir, O_PATH);
496 			if (path_beneath.parent_fd == -1)
497 				fatal("%s: can't open %s for landlock: %s",
498 				    __func__, l->dir, strerror(errno));
499 
500 			err = landlock_add_rule(fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
501 			    &path_beneath, 0);
502 			if (err)
503 				fatal("%s: landlock_add_rule(%s) failed: %s",
504 				    __func__, l->dir, strerror(errno));
505 
506 			close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
507 		}
508 	}
509 
510 	return fd;
511 }
512 #endif
513 
514 void
515 sandbox_server_process(void)
516 {
517 	int fd;
518 	struct sock_fprog prog = {
519 		.len = (unsigned short) (sizeof(filter) / sizeof(filter[0])),
520 		.filter = filter,
521 	};
522 
523 #ifdef SC_DEBUG
524 	sandbox_seccomp_catch_sigsys();
525 #endif
526 
527 #if HAVE_LANDLOCK
528 	log_warn(NULL, "loading landlock...");
529 	fd = server_landlock();
530 #else
531 	(void)fd;		/* avoid unused var warning */
532 #endif
533 
534 	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
535 		fatal("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
536 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
537 
538 #if HAVE_LANDLOCK
539 	if (fd != -1) {
540 		if (landlock_restrict_self(fd, 0))
541 			fatal("%s: landlock_restrict_self: %s",
542 			    __func__, strerror(errno));
543 		close(fd);
544 	}
545 #endif
546 
547 	if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) == -1)
548 		fatal("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s\n",
549 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
550 }
551 
552 void
553 sandbox_executor_process(void)
554 {
555 	/*
556 	 * We cannot use seccomp for the executor process because we
557 	 * don't know what the child will do.  Also, our filter will
558 	 * be inherited so the child cannot set its own seccomp
559 	 * policy.
560 	 */
561 	return;
562 }
563 
564 void
565 sandbox_logger_process(void)
566 {
567 	/*
568 	 * To be honest, here we could use a seccomp policy to only
569 	 * allow writev(2) and memory allocations.
570 	 */
571 	return;
572 }
573 
574 #elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
575 
576 #include <unistd.h>
577 
578 void
579 sandbox_server_process(void)
580 {
581 	struct vhost	*h;
582 	struct location	*l;
583 
584 	TAILQ_FOREACH(h, &hosts, vhosts) {
585 		TAILQ_FOREACH(l, &h->locations, locations) {
586 			if (l->dir == NULL)
587 				continue;
588 
589 			if (unveil(l->dir, "r") == -1)
590 				fatal("unveil %s for domain %s",
591 				    l->dir,
592 				    h->domain);
593 		}
594 	}
595 
596 	if (pledge("stdio recvfd rpath inet", NULL) == -1)
597 		fatal("pledge");
598 }
599 
600 void
601 sandbox_executor_process(void)
602 {
603 	struct vhost	*h;
604 	struct location	*l;
605 	struct fcgi	*f;
606 	size_t		 i;
607 
608 	TAILQ_FOREACH(h, &hosts, vhosts) {
609 		TAILQ_FOREACH(l, &h->locations, locations) {
610 			if (l->dir == NULL)
611 				continue;
612 
613 			/* r so we can chdir into the directory */
614 			if (unveil(l->dir, "rx") == -1)
615 				fatal("unveil %s for domain %s",
616 				    l->dir, h->domain);
617 		}
618 	}
619 
620 	for (i = 0; i < FCGI_MAX; i++) {
621                 f = &fcgi[i];
622 		if (f->path != NULL) {
623 			if (unveil(f->path, "rw") == -1)
624 				fatal("unveil %s", f->path);
625 		}
626 
627 		if (f->prog != NULL) {
628 			if (unveil(f->prog, "rx") == -1)
629 				fatal("unveil %s", f->prog);
630 		}
631 	}
632 
633 	/*
634 	 * rpath: to chdir into the correct directory
635 	 * proc exec: CGI
636 	 * dns inet unix: FastCGI
637 	 */
638 	if (pledge("stdio rpath sendfd proc exec dns inet unix", NULL))
639 		err(1, "pledge");
640 }
641 
642 void
643 sandbox_logger_process(void)
644 {
645 	if (pledge("stdio recvfd", NULL) == -1)
646 		err(1, "pledge");
647 }
648 
649 #else
650 
651 #warning "No sandbox method known for this OS"
652 
653 void
654 sandbox_server_process(void)
655 {
656 	return;
657 }
658 
659 void
660 sandbox_executor_process(void)
661 {
662 	log_notice(NULL, "no sandbox method known for this OS");
663 }
664 
665 void
666 sandbox_logger_process(void)
667 {
668 	return;
669 }
670 
671 #endif