The FreeBSD and Linux' sandbox can't deal with `fastcgi' and `proxy' configuration rules: new sockets needs to be opened and it's either impossible (the former) or a huge pain in the arse (the latter). The sandbox is still always used in case only static files are served.

I really want to get rid of the `executor' process hack for CGI scripts and its escalation to allow fastcgi and proxying to work on non-OpenBSD. This drops the CGI support and the `executor' process entirely and is the first step towards gmid 2.0. It also allows to have more secure defaults. On non-OpenBSD systems this means that the sandbox will be deactivated as soon as fastcgi or proxying are used: you can't open sockets under FreeBSD' capsicum(4) and I don't want to go thru the pain of making it work under linux' seccomp/landlock. Patches are always welcome however. For folks using CGI scripts (hey, I'm one of you!) not all hope is lost: fcgiwrap or OpenBSD' slowcgi(8) are ways to run CGI scripts as they were FastCGI applications. fixes for the documentation and to the non-OpenBSD sandboxes will follow.

matches found with % grep -R '=[ ]*{' . | fgrep -v const

be more strict and allow an openat only with the O_RDONLY flag. This is kind of redundant with landlock, but still good to have. Landlock is not yet widely available and won't kill the process upon policy violation; furthermore, landlock can be disabled at boot time. tested on GNU and musl libc on arch and alpine amd64.

Mickaël Salaün, the landlock author, pointed out the same error on the got implementation. The assumption that not listed access capabilities are implicitly denied is completely wrong: > In a nutshell, the ruleset's handled_access_fs is required for > backward and forward compatibility (i.e. the kernel and user space may > not know each other's supported restrictions), hence the need to be > explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.

It's been there for a long time, and it's frankly annoying to pretend to use parameters. Most of the time, they're there to satisfy an interface and nothings more.

otherwise landlock will refuse to enable itself and the logger process dies.

it's needed by bufferevent_read

refactor the landlock-related code into something more manageable. The only real difference is that before the logger process would try to landlock itself to "/" without perms, something that landlock doesn't support (now it enables landlock and then restrict itself, which is the correct move.)