Otherwise, 'got merge -c' can silently revert already committed changes. Also fix GOT_ERR_MERGE_COMMIT_OUT_OF_DATE by giving it a value distinct from GOT_ERR_MERGE_STAGED_PATHS. Patch by James Cook

ok op@

As discussed with op and stsp on irc, this prevents the valid case of changing a commit's author to yourself during a histedit operation, and potentially blocks other valid use cases too. ok stsp@ and op@

ok stsp@

found by and ok op@, who also provided the test case

The listen process now communicates the client UID/GID to the parent, and the auth process verifies this on behalf of the parent. This allows us to remove the "unix" pledge promise from the parent, removing parent access to syscalls such as listen() and accept() in the AF_UNIX domain. ok tracey@ op@

Allowing such author fields breaks 'got send' towards Github for affected commits because git-index-pack --strict will error out on the server: $ git index-pack --strict pack-de791fb6a3a1961e44ac5d98d72fd533bf9277c8.pack error: object 5d6bde9eaaf27f41ae8fa7112bb45e489d3c16b9: missingSpaceBeforeEmail: invalid author/committer line - missing space before email fatal: fsck error in packed object problem encountered by landry@ ok op@

This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients. Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here, but this server is not yet expected to be stable. More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions. The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository, which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future. At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository. This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop. At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises: "stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil" The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5). Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd". The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine without such help, because Git repositories can be read without having to create any lock-files. gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access to the gotd(8) socket. To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1). gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection. gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell. At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected from modification). While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal, making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access over ssh(1) is on the road map.

Spotted by stsp@ while considering a feature request for cmd_integrate. ok stsp@

ok stsp@

This adds a new flag, `got commit -A', that allows to specify the commit author but retains the "committer" (which is obtained as usual via GOT_AUTHOR, got.conf or git config.) with lots of help from and ok stsp

ok stsp@

This should fail without creating any tag. Before, ssh-keygen(1) would print an error to stderr, but got would create an unsigned tag. ok op@

This adds a new -s flag to 'got tag' that specifies the signer identity (for example, a key file) of the tagger. The tag object will include a signature that validates each of the tag object headers and the tag message. Verifying these signed tags requires maintaining an allowed signers file which maps signer identities (i.e. the email address of the tagger) to SSH public keys. See ssh-keygen(1) for more details of the allowed signers file. After creating this file and providing the path to it in got.conf(5) using the allowed_signers option, tags may be verified using with 'got tag -V tag_name'. The return code will be non-zero if a signature fails to verify. ok stsp@

ok op, tracey