refactor the landlock-related code into something more manageable. The only real difference is that before the logger process would try to landlock itself to "/" without perms, something that landlock doesn't support (now it enables landlock and then restrict itself, which is the correct move.)

Disallow everything landlock can handle. The logger process doesn't need any fs access (on OpenBSD it runs with pledge("stdio recvfd")).

Trying to implement some landlock policies (rules?) where possible. The server process is, of course, the most dangerous process so start with that. The following should be equivalent to the unveil(2) call on OpenBSD: allows only to read files and directories inside the vhost roots. I'm assuming seccomp is enabled so I'm not trying to disallow actions such as LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE or LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE which require syscalls that are already disallowed. I'm only trying to limit the damage that the currently allowed system calls can do. e.g. since write(2) is allowed, gmid could modify *any* file it has access to; this is now forbidden by landlock. There are still too many #ifdefs for my tastes, but it's still better than the seccomp code.

Since there was 0 reports in a month can I assume it's not actually used anywhere?

used by glibc on aarch64. Found and tested by pine, thanks!

before we matched ppc64le as ppc64 (which is big ending I presume), so the seccomp filter would always kill gmid #4 related

Calling `configure' with --disable-sandbox will disable the sandbox support *completely* at compile time. gmid will still complain at compile time and during the startup. Users shouldn't disable the sandbox if possible, but instead report problem upstream so they get fixed (hopefully.) #4 related

* SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH extended to support more architectures * relax fcntl policy: allow the syscall regardless of the flags * wrap every syscall in a ifdef, and add some (statx, fcntl64, ...) used in x86 Some bits were taken from dhcpcd[0], thanks! #4 related [0]: https://roy.marples.name/git/dhcpcd/blob/HEAD:/src/privsep-linux.c

the logger process now can receive a file descriptor to write logs to. At the moment the logic is simple, if it receives a file it logs there, otherwise it logs to syslog. This will allow to log on custom log files.

Not production-ready yet, but it's a start. This adds a third ``backend'' for gmid: until now there it served local files or CGI scripts, now FastCGI applications too. FastCGI is meant to be an improvement over CGI: instead of exec'ing a script for every request, it allows to open a single connection to an ``application'' and send the requests/receive the responses over that socket using a simple binary protocol. At the moment gmid supports three different methods of opening a fastcgi connection: - local unix sockets, with: fastcgi "/path/to/sock" - network sockets, with: fastcgi tcp "host" [port] port defaults to 9000 and can be either a string or a number - subprocess, with: fastcgi spawn "/path/to/program" the fastcgi protocol is done over the executed program stdin of these, the last is only for testing and may be removed in the future. P.S.: the fastcgi rule is per-location of course :)