Commits


introduce gotd(8), a Git repository server reachable via ssh(1) This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients. Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here, but this server is not yet expected to be stable. More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions. The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository, which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future. At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository. This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop. At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises: "stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil" The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5). Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd". The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine without such help, because Git repositories can be read without having to create any lock-files. gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access to the gotd(8) socket. To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1). gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection. gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell. At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected from modification). While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal, making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access over ssh(1) is on the road map.


remove trailing whitespace; patch by Josiah Frentsos


fix snprintf error handling follow the "proper secure idiom" described in the CAVEATS section of printf(3). reminded by tb@ and millert@


Do not ignore error from got_pathlist_append. Found by llvm's scan-build (dead store). OK stsp


imsg_add() frees its msg argument on error; avoid double-free in error paths


const-ify tables ok thomas_adam millert


apply time-based rate-limiting to got-send-pack upload progress output


plug memory leaks in got-fetch-pack and got-send-pack ok naddy


whitespace fix from Omar Polo


fix some integers that had a slightly wrong type; patch by Omar Polo


de-duplicate a constant used by both 'got fetch' and 'got send' Both GOT_FETCH_PKTMAX and GOT_SEND_PKTMAX had the same value. Declare this value as GOT_PKT_MAX in got_lib_pkt.h instead.


indentation fixes


move more code used by got-send-pack and got-fetch-pack to a common file Move functions and data structures which implement Git protocol features required for fetching and sending pack files to new files lib/gitproto.c and lib/got_lib_gitproto.h. This code was duplicated in got-fetch-pack and got-send-pack. No functional change.


move pkt code used by got-fetch-pack and got-send-pack to a common file The Git protocol uses a simple packet framing format. The got-fetch-pack and got-send-pack programs contained identical copies of functions to support this format. Move related functions to new file lib/pkt.c and link both programs against this common implementation. No functional change.


do not send a pack file when 'got send' is only deleting branches The git protocol spec says the client MUST NOT send a pack file if the only command used is 'delete'. Fixes 'got send -d' against Github's server which closed the session upon receiving the empty pack file we sent. This problem wasn't caught by regression tests since git-daemon does accept an empty pack file. Problem reported by jrick.