introduce gotd(8), a Git repository server reachable via ssh(1) This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients. Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here, but this server is not yet expected to be stable. More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions. The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository, which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future. At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository. This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop. At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises: "stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil" The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5). Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd". The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine without such help, because Git repositories can be read without having to create any lock-files. gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access to the gotd(8) socket. To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1). gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection. gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell. At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected from modification). While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal, making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access over ssh(1) is on the road map.

move got_gotconfig_read() into new file read_gotconfig_privsep.c

move code for reading Git's config file into new file read_gitconfig_privsep.c The end goal here is to remove the dependency of repository.c on privsep.c during compilation.

move functions which open objects into new file object_open_privsep.c For the future, this will make it possible to provide alternative implementations of functions now stored in object_open_privsep.c. This will probably be needed by future gotd(8) which runs inside a chroot(2) environment and without the "exec" pledge(2) promise, making it impossible to run libexec helpers on the fly. Details of this design are not yet settled, but moving functions into a separate compilation unit won't hurt in any case.

create and verify tags signed by SSH keys This adds a new -s flag to 'got tag' that specifies the signer identity (for example, a key file) of the tagger. The tag object will include a signature that validates each of the tag object headers and the tag message. Verifying these signed tags requires maintaining an allowed signers file which maps signer identities (i.e. the email address of the tagger) to SSH public keys. See ssh-keygen(1) for more details of the allowed signers file. After creating this file and providing the path to it in got.conf(5) using the allowed_signers option, tags may be verified using with 'got tag -V tag_name'. The return code will be non-zero if a signature fails to verify. ok stsp@

gotweb does not actually use anything from worktree.c or fileindex.c

use a bloom filter to avoid pointless pack index searches

make gotweb compile with the new diff implementation

add per-worktree got.conf(5) file in the .got directory; ok millert

fix gotweb build on sparc64; the old linker wants to see -lz after -lkcgi

make gotweb's install target respect DESTDIR for the devel/got port

add gotweb(8) man page and move README info there; discussed with tracey

ensure that we always install static binaries to gotweb's chroot Compile static libexec binaries for gotweb, keeping them separate from the main build. Use the same source files but a separate set of Makefiles. Previously, 'make web-install' installed whichever libexec binaries had already been built, and if those happened to be dynamically linked they failed to run inside the chroot which resulted in "privsep peer process closed pipe" being rendered on the index page.

link just gotweb with kcgi, not the libexec helpers

create dir for public repos during 'make web-install'; avoids an unveil error