copyright years++

sort pledge promises as per pledge(2)

drop `proc' pledge in the main process unlike the name might suggest, proc_kill() doesn't use kill(2) so proc is not needed.

drop questionable #warning

add a privsep crypto engine Incorporate the OpenSMTPD' privsep crypto engine. The idea behind it is to never load the certificate' private keys in a networked process, instead they are loaded in a separate process (the `crypto' one) which signs payloads on the behalf of the server processes. This way, we greatly reduce the risk of leaking the certificate' private key should the server process be compromised. This currently compiles only on LibreSSL (portable fix is in the way).

fix sandbox_server_process it does the unveil(2)ing based on the first config, which breaks config-reloading.

provide sandbox_main_process on !OpenBSD

rework the daemon to do fork+exec It uses the 'common' proc.c from various OpenBSD-daemons. gmid grew organically bit by bit and it was also the first place where I tried to implement privsep. It wasn't done very well, in fact the parent process (that retains root privileges) just fork()s a generation of servers, all sharing *exactly* the same address space. No good! Now, we fork() and re-exec() ourselves, so that each process has a fresh address space. Some features (require client ca for example) are temporarly disabled, will be fixed in subsequent commits. The "ge" program is also temporarly disabled as it needs tweaks to do privsep too.

use fatal() in code used in the daemon

switch to the more usual log.c

rename log.[ch] to logger.[ch]

provide a more usual fatal fatal usually appends the error string. Add 'fatalx' that doesn't. Fix callers and move the prototypes to log.h

send capsicum/landlock/seccomp hack to Valhalla

drop landlock/seccomp and capsicum support it reached a point where this stuff is not maintenable. I'd like to move forward with gmid, but the restriction of capsicum and the linux environment at large that make landlock unusable (how can you resolve DNS portably when under landlock?) -and don't get me started on seccomp- makes it impossible for me to do any work. So, I prefer removing the crap, resuming working on gmid by cleaning stuff and consolidating the features, improving various things etc... and then eventually see how to introduce some sandboxing again on other systems. Patches to resume sandboxing are, as always, welcome!

adjust pledge/unveil on OpenBSD to connect to unix-domain sockets the `unix' pledge is needed and also unveil "w". gmid can't mutate files because it doesn't pledge `wpath' nor `cpath'.